The Presidential election will be held in Turkmenistan on 12 March. Despite the fact that nine candidates have been nominated, the main intrigue is not who will become the next head of state, but rather what to expect from the presidency of Serdar Berdymukhammedov.
Elephant in the room
Let us first point to the elephant in the room – these elections are not legitimate, are held in violation of the Constitution, and are based on contradictory laws.
Taking into account that, in violation of the Constitution, the incumbent President Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov assumed the role of Chairman of the upper chamber of Turkmenistan’s Parliament, the situation is quite absurd: the head of state resigned before the expiration of his term (it is impossible to call early elections) and handed over his responsibilities to himself as Chairman.
In other words, as of today Berdymukhammedov senior is simultaneously a former President, not able to perform his duties, and is acting President – which is absolute political nonsense.
Another legislative matter is the contradictory rules between “scheduled” and early Presidential election.
“Scheduled” Presidential elections are called three months before expiry of the term of office of the incumbent President; the election campaign begins three months before the election, and registration of candidates must be completed no later than 25 days before the election.
In the case of early elections, only the voting date is stipulated – no later than 60 days after the resignation of the former head of state. However, a decision was made to call this election in 30 days and registration of candidates was closed on 22 February, 18 days before the voting.
Pursuant to the law, in the case of early elections candidates do not have adequate time to prepare their programs, or for campaigning and meeting with voters. The law does not envisage why early elections need to be held so hastily.
Turkmen duumvirate
Today’s transfer of power in Turkmenistan is unique.Autocrats tend to hold on to their posts until they die from natural causes or are replaced as a result of revolution, even when the power is transferred from father to son, as happened in Azerbaijan in 2003 when Heydar Aliyev passed his seat to Ilham only a month and a half before his death.
This can be partially compared with the situation Kazakhstan when Nursultan Nazarbayev transfered his Presidential seat to Kassym-Jomart Tokayev but at the same time held on a wide range of powers.
It would appear that Turkmenistan was inspired by this example.However, this tandem in Kazahstan was not based on family ties, but fell apart very quickly, failing to stand the test of the January events there.
The transfer of power is a rather vulnerable period for autocracies when internal conflicts of successive elites can be exacerbated.Apparently, there are increased risks when power is distributed within one family, where each member understands true nature of the others, where family members hold a grudge for many years and start dividing into “us” and “them”.
This is what often happens in households when the inherited property is split.In our case a big family is splitting the country.
Will the family ties be an advantage or, conversely, a hindrance of duumvirate in Turkmenistan?
Who is Mr. Serdar Berdimuhamedov?
Will Turkmen tandemocracy turn out to be more viable than in Kazakhstan? Will Turkmenistan move towards liberalization, continue current policy or tighten restrictions and repressions? Many experts on Central Asia are asking these questions but, actually, nobody knows the answers.
The situation in Turkmenistan is impossible to predict based on laws, politological theories and sometimes even on common sense. To a large extent the decisions taken depend on the personality of the head of state and his subjective view, but his actions are actually not actually limited by Parliament or the courts.
Moreover, almost nothing is known about Serdar Berdymukhammedov’s personal qualities despite the fact that he is one of the key media personalities who has been in the public eye since 2016.
Without any concrete answers, to be able to forecast the near future of Turkmenistan, a range of questions can be posed, which in their own context can reveal some features of the future regime, which will allow a better understanding of events in the country, whatever they may be.
The main question is how independent is Berdymukhammedov junior.For the past six years, after he started preparing himself as the successor to the President, he has occupied a number of positions in the government and the Parliament, but did he proactively initiate these reshuffles or simply obediently respond to the will of his father, who tried to “train” him by showing him the existing structure of the Turkmen state?
After the rise to power, during times of instability, a new head of state usually carries out fundamental liberal reforms.For example, Gurbanguly Berdymukhammedov, who was young at that time, embarked on his presidency by carrying out quite serious positive reforms: he rescinded the most controversial orders issued by Saparmurat Niyazov on the renaming of weeks and days, abolished the mandatory study of the Rukhnama and welcomed the internet connection in Turkmenistan.
However, there was no predecessor behind his back who could have considered these reforms as criticism.
Will Serdar have enough political will to carry out similar reforms?As has been previously about:blank, in the Turkmen culture a son does not dare to go against his father, which might suggest that no fundamental changes are expected.
However, the temptation to finally take control of the situation by getting rid of the domination of the past six years should not be underestimated.Kazakhstan’s experience also demonstrates that an incumbent autocratic President can easily dismiss even a high-ranking predecessor if needed.
On the other hand, does Berdymukhammedov junior, with experience in the existing system, see the need for radical change?
Some slight positive changes can be expected to generate the confidence of western countries with a view to attract investments as well as gain public support.
For instance, according to correspondents of “Chronicles of Turkmenistan”, Turkmen residents hope that Serdar will lower the “black” market dollar exchange rate to at least 15-16 manats, relax quarantine measures and resume international air services, which would allow Turkmen nationals who have been stranded abroad over the past two years, to return home.
However, in this case, the returnees, outraged by such negligence by the state, might pose an obvious question why couldn’t the problem have been solved earlier if the solution is so easy?
The entrepreneurs who have lost money and even sometimes, business, might ask the same question.
It is unlikely that this will cause public anger, which would urge residents to take to the streets (hello again, Kazakhstan!) but a natural solution to the social crisis, other than the use of force, would be to identify those who will be pointing fingers, usually at a predecessor who bequeath all these problems?
Needless to say, it should be taken into account that the situation is never stable and the person who assumes absolute power changes quickly, often for the worse and starts blaming others for his own failure and those who prevent him from pursuing his policies.
The post The third “highly esteemed”.
What to expect from Serdar Berdymukhammedov? first appeared on Chronicles of Turkmenistan.